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Organization of trade 
Market access for beef exports to high-value developed 
country markets (USA, EU) requires freedom from foot-
and-mouth disease (FMD) as a precondition for trade, with 
countries from Southern Africa requiring disease freedom 
without vaccination (Rich & Winter-Nelson 2007). This 
necessitates strict biosecurity controls through physical 
zonation of FMD-free and FMD-endemic regions in country. 
In Namibia, the veterinary cordon fence (VCF) splits the 
northern part of the country (with predominately smallholder 
communal production) from the southern part of the country 
with large-scale, export-oriented commercial production; 
approximately one-half of Namibia’s livestock are on either 
side of the fence. Only the southern part of the country has 
access to the European market. This divergence in market 
access is important to the Namibian government, which 
seeks to improve the ability of smallholder farmers and the 
emerging Namibian middle classes with larger herds, to 
access higher-value international markets.  The export of 
both live animals and meat from northern communal areas 
to South Africa is restricted by strict quarantine rules and 
since the FMD outbreak in 2015, exports of both animals and 
meat from areas north of the VCF were banned and expensive 
remedial measures put in place (The Namibian, 2015 and 
New Era, 2016).  Likewise, Botswana maintains different 
production zones that are certified as FMD-free without 
vaccination by the World Animal Health Organization (OIE) 
that are physically separated by a double-ringed fence and 
combined with strict livestock identification and traceability 
protocols. Lapses in this system during 2011 forced Botswana 
to shut down exports for six months (Moreki et al, 2012). 
Exports from both countries primarily target markets in South 
Africa, the European Union, and Norway, with the latter two 
facilitated by preferences under the General Schedule of 
Preferences (GSP) and, in the case of Norway, a variety of 
market access quotas. A free trade agreement between SACU 
and Norway allows for a 500-ton duty-free quota from exports 
from SACU countries (Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, South 
Africa, Swaziland) to Norway and is administered by an 
Take-home messages
•	 While market access quotas have generated high 
levels of rents for traders and exporters in Namibia, 
Botswana, Norway, and offshore entities in the UK, 
their developmental benefits are diffuse, unclear, 
and difficult to unpack;
•	 The consolidation of trade between small supply 
(Namibia, Botswana) and demand markets 
(Norway) provides some unique advantages for 
trading parties, given the former’s efficiency and 
scale disadvantages in international trade, and the 
latter’s desire to actively manage its food imports;   
•	 However, such a strategy is not necessarily 
replicable or scalable, as it entails both high entry 
costs for access and high risks from the over-
reliance on a limited number of markets and the 
specter of animal disease incursions.
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Case overview/summary
Namibia and Botswana each hold over two million head of 
cattle, and where small-scale, communal production is an 
important livelihood for the majority of farmers engaged 
in livestock.  An important tension in each country has 
been balancing the livelihood demands of predominately 
smallholder-oriented systems on the one hand with the 
regulations and investments needed to facilitate and preserve 
market access for exports on the other. While both countries 
have made many significant investments in biosecurity to 
access lucrative markets in the European Union and Norway, 
the preferential trade arrangements that facilitate exports are 
controversial. In particular, the use of quotas has politicized 
the beef trade in both supplying and end markets. This 
has led to questions in various quarters as to whether such 
quotas sufficiently regulate and manage trade to meet both 
developmental objectives on the one hand and Norwegian 
desire to limit certain imports on the other.
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auction. In addition, Botswana and Namibia co-administer 
a duty-free quota of 2,700 tons that was grandfathered from 
the previous General System of Preferences (GSP) preferential 
trade regime Norway maintained with developing countries, 
with each country receiving one-half of the quota based on 
negotiations between Meatco and BMC (Rich et al. 2012; 
Aurdal & Omhalt 2013). 
The GSP quota is allocated through a licensing mechanism 
administered in each country. In Botswana, only the BMC 
has quota rights, whereas in Namibia, the government 
allocates the quota to export-oriented abattoirs. Licensing 
of the GSP quota replaced the previous first-come, first-
serve (FCFS) means of quota allocation in 2011, which had 
been problematic in that the quota would literally fill within 
minutes of its opening on the 1st of January each year (Rich 
et al. 2012). As the GSP quota has come under scrutiny as to 
its WTO legality (Rich et al. 2012), discussions are underway 
to subsume it under a free-trade agreement with SACU. 
However, it is not yet clear whether the new SACU quota (that 
would incorporate the GSP quota) will be administered as an 
auction or under license, with industry favouring the status 
quo of licensing.
Beef exports have been traditionally controlled by parastal-
type enterprises (Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) in 
Botswana, MeatCo in Namibia). A key component of trade 
with Norway is the involvement of Nortura, an agricultural 
cooperative and the largest processor of meat in Norway, 
which has a parallel role as market regulator (Aurdal 
& Omhalt 2013). Nortura’s interest in trade with SACU 
countries has been motivated by its desire to facilitate 
imports in a manner not disruptive to the domestic market 
and as a form of corporate social responsibility to improve 
beef production in Botswana and Namibia. Nortura began 
importing small amounts of beef directly in 2009, buying 
its way into the market through the purchase of an equity 
share in one of Namibian’s few certified export-oriented 
abattoirs, Witvlei. The Witvlei abattoir was originally set up 
as an empowerment business by the Government of Namibia 
with a view to eventually breaking up the export monopoly 
of MeatCo.  
Since 2014, when trade with Witvlei stopped, Nortura has 
traded directly with Global Proteins Solutions Group (GPS), 
a UK-based meat broker that plays a critical role in the beef 
trade between SACU and Norway. GPS plays an important 
intermediary role between MeatCo, BMC, and retailers, 
providing technical support in production, logistics, and 
marketing for the purposes of adding value to Namibian 
and Botswanan beef. GPS acts as a service provider on a 
fee-basis and not as a traditional wholesaler or trader. GPS 
currently sit in a network of business arrangements (through 
various equity investments) among the meat industries of 
Southern Africa, the United Kingdom and Norway.  This web 
of ownership presents a challenge for policy makers who 
seek foreign investment, but who also want fair and inclusive 
domestic and international meat trading arrangements that 
engage all scales of production including the very small 
scale.  
What are some of the main effects of market 
access quotas?
Our analysis points to three important impacts associated 
with market access quotas on trade dynamics between 
Namibia/Botswana, and Norway. These are detailed in turn.
Rent seeking by firms
Arrangements on the licensing of the main GSP quota in 
Namibia have prompted significant rent-seeking behaviour 
amongst local abattoirs and Norwegian interests. In 
2011, when the quota was first allocated internally, it 
was distributed evenly between MeatCo, a government 
parastatal/producer-run cooperative, and Witvlei, a private 
abbatoir. MeatCo historically produces about 80 percent of 
Namibia’s export-oriented meat and had strongly argued for 
an allocation of the quota more in line with the current and 
historical trends of production. 
Witvlei was established in 1998 and run under a lease 
agreement with the Agribank, by one of Namibian’s richest 
entrepreneurs with close ties to the Namibian government 
(New Era 2016a). Witvlei was 30% owned by Nortura. 
Previously, Witvlei was part of a partnership between two 
other Norwegian trading houses, but this broke down over 
a price dispute (Rich et al. 2012). Nortura’s stated aim was 
development-oriented in bringing Namibian prices to near-
Norwegian levels, although previous discussions suggested 
that this was a means to capture margins previously held by 
importers (Rich et al. 2012). 
Namibia’s Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) stepped in to 
litigate the dispute between MeatCo and Witvlei. In 2014, the 
quota was reallocated such that MeatCo obtained 1,200 tons, 
Witvlei 300 tons, and Brukarros Meat Processors (BMP) 100 
tons; the BMP quota was eventually re-allocated 50:50 when 
it emerged it could not meet export standards (Schlechter 
2014). Witvlei ceased operations later in 2014, with Nortura 
resigning from the board and engaged in a dispute with 
meat owed to it by Witvlei (Vermes 2015). As of December 
2015, Witvlei was in receivership, with its abattoir owned by 
AgriBank, a government-owned bank (New Era 2016b). In 
April 2016, Witvlei won its court case against AgriBank and 
regained access to its abattoir. 
Internal distribution of quota rents
The entry of GPS has transformed trading dynamics and the 
rents generated by trade between Namibia and Europe. An 
important difference in their approach compared to past 
trading efforts has been on altering the product mix from 
predominantly frozen cuts to fresh cuts and on marketing. 
This has led to strong price gains, with returns increasing 
132% in Namibia and 65% in Botswana. 
Since 2010, we observe a nominal doubling in the exporter 
surplus in Norwegian Kroner (NOK) terms during 2010-18, 
reflecting in large part the movement towards higher-value 
fresh cuts as facilitated by GPS. By contrast, surpluses at 
the importer level have been steady to declining since 2011. 
Auction rates – revenue for the Norwegian government – on a 
per-kg basis for the 500-ton SACU auction have been steadily 
rising to a high of 15.81 NOK/kg in 2016, then falling again 
in 2017-2018. As these are also increasing as a share of the 
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export price, they imply both an increase due to the import 
of higher-value product and higher competition for a smaller 
pool of available meat by traders. 
To what extent have rents been used to benefit Namibian and 
Botswanan actors? In Namibia, quotas seem to be the only 
alternative to the damaging dash to grab licenses that used 
to occur among exporters, but it is far from a precise policy 
instrument. Splitting the quota amongst different export 
actors failed to infuse more market competition, spurring 
instead competition for rents.  Moreover, because the 
benefit has largely fallen in commercial farming areas, their 
development impact is less quantifiable. In Norway, quotas 
have certainly facilitated an orderly trade.  
It is certainly true that there have been significant 
investments in brand building and differentiation that have 
added value in the beef sector. At the same time, it is equally 
important to ask whether the monopsony buyer (MeatCo/
BMC), monopoly marketer (GPS) hampers competition and 
innovation, and reduces the potential benefits to farmers. 
Another consideration is whether the Norwegian meat sector 
itself wants more competition with its own production. Given 
Nortura’s role in this trade arrangement, this could stymie 
the potential ceiling for Namibian and Botswanan value-
adding efforts.   An alternative view to this upgrading through 
product differentiation, offered by international meat traders 
interviewed, was that value addition was rather limited and 
that more could be achieved through promoting competition 
among traders for the Botswanan and Namibian access to the 
high value Norwegian market.  However, we would argue that 
in the absence of scale efficiencies, efforts made by GPS in 
terms of differentiation and value addition are the only game 
in town, although the managed value chain highlighted here 
may place a ceiling on those potential gains. Indeed, even with 
growing supermarket and high-value branded sales, there are 
some questions as to the extent that Namibian or Botswanan 
beef can out-compete local production – recall, that Nortura 
is the largest producer cooperative in Norway and has an 
interest in managing trade and competition. Interviewed 
traders describe the Norwegian meat market as ‘nationalistic’ 
suggesting that branding could be counterproductive, as the 
market for such products may have a hard ceiling relative to 
locally produced meat. 
Competitiveness
Earlier research detailed the negative impact that preferential 
quotas have had on the overall competitiveness of Botswana 
and Namibia in global beef markets (Rich & Perry 2011; 
Naziri et al. 2015). Indeed, one of Nortura’s stated aims is 
to eventually bring beef prices in both countries to 85- 90% 
of Norwegian levels. Given that agricultural protection 
in Norway affords local Norwegian producers among the 
highest prices for beef in the world, this potentially has two 
important effects. First, it increases the reliance of Botswana 
and Namibia on the Norwegian market as a means of keeping 
farm prices high since prices beef sold regionally in Africa is 
less than the producer price for beef in European markets. 
While this indirectly benefits smallholder producers and 
represents a positive development impact, it exposes both 
countries in the event of various shocks such as an outbreak 
of FMD. Second, high prices for beef from Botswana and 
Namibia increase the difficulty that both countries could have 
in diversifying their markets, particularly from communal 
areas, as margins to markets such as China will certainly not 
match Norway. 
Conclusions
The recent experiences of Namibian and Botswana in 
exporting to Norway are illustrative of a number of potential 
costs and benefits of using defined market access as a 
development policy tool.  There is clear evidence that both 
countries have benefited financially from market access.  
In both countries, market access to high value markets has 
resulted in investment in infrastructure and capacity to meet 
international food safety and animal health standards that 
would not have otherwise existed.  Namibia and Botswana 
are rightly proud of their exports of beef because they 
demonstrate a hard-won ability to trade meeting the highest 
global standards.  This reputational benefit should not be 
under-estimated.
However, the wider developmental impacts of market access 
are harder to measure.  Market access has brought some 
employment and some investment in infrastructure.  Efforts 
in both countries to use market access to redress previous 
imbalances in the structure of rural economies cannot be 
said to have yet fully achieved their aims.  The converse is 
also true, that, without this access and investment, the 
contribution of livestock to these economies would be lower. 
In both countries, continued competitiveness on global 
markets is still the defining question in this debate. 
Addressing costs through greater efficiency and novel 
compliance methods such as commodity-based trade are 
possible ways forward.  Value-adding and branding efforts 
are critical to this, but reliance on the highly protected and 
parochial Norwegian market may stymie innovation. Clearly, 
sufficient quota rents in aggregate exist to find ways to add 
value to products sold in Norway to the benefit of producers, 
but possibly not consumers, but this will require greater 
awareness and participation of producers. In Namibia, the 
democratization of MeatCo’s governance structure towards 
functioning as a producer cooperative may facilitate such an 
outlook. 
Are there advantages in unifying behind a single trade partner 
and a limited number of Norwegian traders?  The case study 
suggests the combination of scale disadvantages in trade 
for Namibia and Botswana, and Norway’s desire to actively 
manage its food imports has created a unique and symbiotic 
trading relationship that works for all parties. However, such 
a strategy is not necessarily replicable or scalable, as it entails 
both high entry costs for access and high risks from the over-
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